diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'roles/web/files/nginx/conf.d')
| -rw-r--r-- | roles/web/files/nginx/conf.d/security_headers.conf | 79 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | roles/web/files/nginx/conf.d/ssl.conf | 69 |
2 files changed, 148 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/roles/web/files/nginx/conf.d/security_headers.conf b/roles/web/files/nginx/conf.d/security_headers.conf new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f4a7135 --- /dev/null +++ b/roles/web/files/nginx/conf.d/security_headers.conf @@ -0,0 +1,79 @@ +# +# /usr/local/etc/nginx/security_headers +# +# Security headers for Nginx/HTTP(s) +# +# Aaron LI +# 2017-11-22 +# +# Credits +# ------- +# * Hardening your HTTP response headers +# https://scotthelme.co.uk/hardening-your-http-response-headers/ +# * Nginx add_header configuration pitfall +# https://blog.g3rt.nl/nginx-add_header-pitfall.html +# * Nginx - ngx_http_headers_module - add_header +# https://nginx.org/en/docs/http/ngx_http_headers_module.html#add_header +# +# Tools +# ----- +# * Security Headers Analyzer +# https://securityheaders.io/ +# +# 2017-11-23: Be less paranoid, due to the reverse proxy services ... +# + +# +# NOTE: Use "always" for security headers. +# +# WARNING: The "add_header" directive (and some others) are inherited +# from the *previous* level *IF AND ONLY IF* there are NO +# "add_header" directives defined on the *current* level. +# Such behavior leads to the *pitfall* that the added headers +# may get *cleared*! In consequence, this common header +# configuration file *must* be included within every context +# that has "add_header" directives! +# + +# Instruct the client to force a HTTPS connection to the domain and all +# its subdomains for 2 year. +# See also: https://hstspreload.org/ +#add_header Strict-Transport-Security +# "max-age=63072000; includeSubdomains; preload" always; +add_header Strict-Transport-Security + "max-age=31536000; includeSubdomains" always; + +# The Content Security Policy (CSP) header allows to define a whitelist +# of approved sources of content for the site. By restricting the assets +# that a browser can load, CSP can act as an effective countermeasure to +# XSS attacks. +# +# Enforce TLS on all assets and prevent mixed content warnings. +add_header Content-Security-Policy + "default-src https: data: 'unsafe-inline' 'unsafe-eval'" always; +# Only allow to load assets from self! +#add_header Content-Security-Policy "default-src 'self'" always; + +# The X-Frame-Options (XFO) header protects the visitors against +# clickjacking attacks. +# Only allow yourselves to frame your own site. +add_header X-Frame-Options "SAMEORIGIN" always; +# Do not allow the site to be framed at all! +#add_header X-Frame-Options "DENY" always; + +# Enable the cross-site scripting filter built into most browsers, and +# tell the browser to block the response if it detects an attack rather +# than sanitizing the script. +add_header X-XSS-Protection "1; mode=block" always; + +# Prevent a browser from trying to MIME-sniff the content type and forces +# it to stick with the declared content-type. +add_header X-Content-Type-Options "nosniff" always; + +# Allow a site to control how much information the browser includes with +# navigations away from a document. +# +# The browser will send the full URL to requests to the same origin, but +# only send the origin when requests are cross-origin. No information +# allowed to be sent when a scheme downgrade happens. +add_header Referrer-Policy "strict-origin-when-cross-origin" always; diff --git a/roles/web/files/nginx/conf.d/ssl.conf b/roles/web/files/nginx/conf.d/ssl.conf new file mode 100644 index 0000000..acda0eb --- /dev/null +++ b/roles/web/files/nginx/conf.d/ssl.conf @@ -0,0 +1,69 @@ +# +# /usr/local/etc/nginx/conf.d/ssl.conf +# +# SSL/TLS settings for Nginx +# +# Aaron LI +# 2017-04-25 +# +# Credits +# ------- +# * Cipherli.st - Strong Ciphers for Apache, nginx and Lighttpd +# https://cipherli.st/ +# * Strong SSL Security on nginx +# https://raymii.org/s/tutorials/Strong_SSL_Security_On_nginx.html +# * Mozilla - Security - Server Side TLS +# https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Server_Side_TLS +# https://mozilla.github.io/server-side-tls/ssl-config-generator/ +# * Let's Encrypt & Nginx +# https://letsecure.me/secure-web-deployment-with-lets-encrypt-and-nginx/ +# * Nginx SSL and TLS Deployment Best Practice +# https://www.linode.com/docs/web-servers/nginx/nginx-ssl-and-tls-deployment-best-practices +# * Best nginx configuration for improved security (and performance) +# https://gist.github.com/plentz/6737338 +# * Hardening your HTTP response headers +# https://scotthelme.co.uk/hardening-your-http-response-headers/ +# +# Tools +# ----- +# * Qualys SSL Labs SSL Server Test +# https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/ +# * Security Headers Analyzer +# https://securityheaders.io/ +# + + +# Diffie-Hellman group: +# $ openssl dhparam -out /usr/local/etc/ssl/dhparam2048.pem 2048 +# or even go with 4096-bit DH pool: +# $ openssl dhparam -out /usr/local/etc/ssl/dhparam4096.pem 4096 +# NOTE: This may take up to tens of minutes ... +#ssl_dhparam /usr/local/etc/ssl/dhparam2048.pem; +ssl_dhparam /usr/local/etc/ssl/dhparam4096.pem; + +# Only use the latest TLS protocols +# TLSv1.3 requires nginx >= 1.13 +#ssl_protocols TLSv1.2 TLSv1.3; +ssl_protocols TLSv1.2; +ssl_prefer_server_ciphers on; +# Credit: https://mozilla.github.io/server-side-tls/ssl-config-generator/ +ssl_ciphers 'ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256'; + +ssl_session_timeout 1d; +ssl_session_cache shared:SSL:50m; +# Credit: https://github.com/mozilla/server-side-tls/issues/135 +ssl_session_tickets off; + +# The Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) was created to speed up +# the process that operating systems and browsers use to check for +# certificate revocation. +# Allow the server to send its cached OCSP record to the client during +# the TLS handshake, bypassing the OCSP responder and saving a roundtrip +# between the client and the OCSP responder. +# +# NOTE: If the "ssl_certificate" file does NOT contain intermediate +# certificates, the certificate of the server certificate issuer +# should be present in the "ssl_trusted_certificate" file. +# +ssl_stapling on; +ssl_stapling_verify on; |